Endogenous Prize Contests

The book comprises five contest models of the Tullock type with endogenous prizes. The first analysis deals with an innovation contest, similar to the one for the new HDTV television standard organized by the FCC in the early 90s, where the prize is a temporary license to operate exclusively with the new technology and is thus endogenous. The second model is that of a monopoly in which property rights can be bypassed, and the monopolist is therefore willing to lower his rent to improve his probability of retaining his position. In the next chapter, stability considerations of dynamic contests are extended to encompass contests with asymmetric as well as endogenous prizes. This investigation is followed by the analysis of evolutionary equilibria in endogenous prize contests. In the last chapter of the book, an indirect evolutionary approach is used to examine a situation with altruists as well as envious individuals, the valuation of winning the contest depending on the individual?s type.